Arsenals of Folly

October 1, 2007
This is the third volume in a history of nuclear weaponry that began with the award-winningThe Making of the Atomic Bomb , but despite its subtitle, this installment might also be described as a chronicle of the unmaking of the arms race. Paralleling the careers of Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, Rhodes builds up to a detailed account of the 1986 Reykjavik summit, at which the two leaders-both eager to achieve peace-nearly came to an agreement on eliminating their nuclear arsenals, before the accord, he says, was sabotaged by then-assistant secretary of defense Richard Perle. The insistence of Perle and other advisers that the U.S. required a strong deterrent against the Soviet Union is held up for particular contempt. "There has never been a realistic military justification for accumulating large, expensive stockpiles of nuclear arms," Rhodes argues. Far from keeping America strong, decades of nuclear arms production have seriously eroded the nation's domestic infrastructure and diminished its citizens' quality of life, he believes. The clarity of the historical record reinforces Rhodes's fiercely held political convictions, ensuring widespread attention as he returns to this critically and commercially successful subject.

November 15, 2007
Pulitzer Prize winner Rhodes (Ctr. for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford Univ.) completes his third volume of works related to the Cold War nuclear buildup (following "The Making of the Atomic Bomb"and "Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb". Combining a riveting narrative with historical data, his work reads like a novel but chronicles the truth of the U.S. and Soviet Union buildup and ultimate takedown of nuclear arms. Detailing the professional careers of Mikhail Gorbachev, Ronald Reagan, and many other Soviet and American officials, Rhodes takes us to the pivotal Reykjavík Summit in 1986 and the ensuing drama, leading ultimately to the end of the arms buildup and the end of the Cold War détente between the two superpowers. This historical record, drawing upon many firsthand accounts and interviews, details pivotal events in world history and should be necessary reading for anyone interested in 20th-century history. Recommended, particularly for academic libraries, but also for larger public libraries.Jenny Emanuel, Univ. of Central Missouri, Warrensburg

Copyright 2007 Library Journal, LLC Used with permission.

August 1, 2007
Asked how U.S. leaders had framed Americas nuclear-weapons policy, Robert McNamara spoke candidly: Each individual decision along the way seemed rational at the time. But the result was insane. In this compelling sequel to The Making of the Atom Bomb (1986) and Dark Sun (1995), Rhodes details the historical circumstances that made each nuclear decision seem deceptively rational while exposing the overarching reality of horrific insanity. Readers thus see how American and Soviet experts invoked past experience with conventional weaponry to justify the stockpiling of nuclear bombs for use on a vast arsenal of missiles, each capable of annihilating entire cities. Such perilous illogic brought the world not security but rather near-calamity when a 1983 NATO exercise almost prompted a nuclear exchange. The illusions of nuclear strategists sustained an even ruder shock in 1986 when the Chernobyl meltdown spewed radioactive fallout across Europe. Still, hardliners on both sides would have perpetuated the arms race had a farm boy from Russia (Gorbachev) and a lifeguard from America (Reagan) not defied cold war orthodoxy when they met at Reykjavik. Conservatives may complain that Rhodes gives too little credit to Reagan, whose commitment tothe Star Wars missile-defense system he blames for almost derailing disarmament talks. But Rhodes gives ample reason for praising Gorbachev as the daring leader an imperiled world needed. An insightful chronicle of epoch-shaping events.(Reprinted with permission of Booklist, copyright 2007, American Library Association.)

August 13, 2007
This is the third volume in a history of nuclear weaponry that began with the award-winning The Making of the Atomic Bomb
, but despite its subtitle, this installment might also be described as a chronicle of the unmaking of the arms race. Paralleling the careers of Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, Rhodes builds up to a detailed account of the 1986 Reykjavik summit, at which the two leaders—both eager to achieve peace—nearly came to an agreement on eliminating their nuclear arsenals, before the accord, he says, was sabotaged by then-assistant secretary of defense Richard Perle. The insistence of Perle and other advisers that the U.S. required a strong deterrent against the Soviet Union is held up for particular contempt. “There has never been a realistic military justification for accumulating large, expensive stockpiles of nuclear arms,” Rhodes argues. Far from keeping America strong, decades of nuclear arms production have seriously eroded the nation's domestic infrastructure and diminished its citizens' quality of life, he believes. The clarity of the historical record reinforces Rhodes's fiercely held political convictions, ensuring widespread attention as he returns to this critically and commercially successful subject.